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ABSTRACT 
The debate about fairness in machine learning has largely centered 
around competing substantive definitions of what fairness or 
nondiscrimination between groups requires. However, very little 
attention has been paid to what precisely a group is. Many recent 
approaches have abandoned observational, or purely statistical, 
definitions of fairness in favor of definitions that require one to 
specify a causal model of the data generating process. The implicit 
ontological assumption of these exercises is that a racial or sex 
group is a collection of individuals who share a trait or attribute, for 
example: the group “female” simply consists in grouping 
individuals who share female-coded sex features. We show this by 
exploring the formal assumption of modularity in causal models, 
which holds that the dependencies captured by one causal pathway 
are invariant to interventions on any other causal pathways. 
Modeling sex, for example, in a causal model proposes two 
substantive claims: 1) There exists a feature, sex-on-its-own, that is 
an inherent trait of an individual that then (causally) brings about 
social phenomena external to it in the world; and 2) the relations 
between sex and its downstream effects can be modified in 
whichever ways and the former feature would still retain the 
meaning that sex has in our world. We argue that these ontological 
assumptions about social groups like sex are conceptual errors. 
Many of the “effects” that sex purportedly “causes” are in fact 
constitutive features of sex as a social status. Together, they give 
the social meaning of sex features, and these social meanings are 
precisely what make sex discrimination a distinctively morally 
problematic type of act that differs from mere irrationality or 
meanness on the basis of a physical feature. Correcting this 
conceptual error has a number of important implications for how 
analytic models can be used to detect discrimination. If what makes 
something discrimination on the basis of a particular social 
grouping is that the practice acts on what it means to be in that 
group in a way that we deem wrongful, then what we need from 
analytic diagrams is a model of what constitutes the social 
grouping. Only then can we have a normative debate about what is 
fair or nondiscriminatory vis-à-vis that group. We suggest that 
formal diagrams of constitutive relations would present an entirely 
different path toward reasoning about discrimination (and relatedly, 
counterfactuals) because they proffer a model of how the meaning 
of a social group emerges from its constitutive features. Whereas 
the value of causal diagrams is to guide the construction and testing 
of sophisticated modular counterfactuals, the value of constitutive 
diagrams would be to identify a different kind of counterfactual as 
central to an inquiry on discrimination: one that asks how the social 
meaning of a group would be changed if its non-modular features 
were altered.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A substantial portion of the field of algorithmic fairness is 
dedicated to theorizing and operationalizing with mathematical 
precision claims about equality or nondiscrimination between 
social groups. This field has flowered hundreds of papers opining 
about the source of “unfairness” in machine learning and 
prediction—from the input data to the algorithmic design—and 
about as many definitions of “fairness” [1-5]. However, there has 
been little to no reflection on the nature of the social objects that 
are at the center of these fairness definitions. Most endeavors share 
common assumptions about the status of the categories addressed, 
categories such as race or sex. In philosophical terms, they all 
proceed with certain—mostly unstated—ontological assumptions, 
or assumptions about the nature and properties of these categories.  
This paper is dedicated to probing the taken-for-granted 
ontological assumptions behind this growing body of work and 
suggesting a route forward. We hope to show that this omission of 
conceptual analysis is not only a shortcoming of philosophical 
rigor, rather it demonstrates a profound limitation of the field’s 
capacity to examine complex phenomena of a social nature. In fact, 
we argue that one can’t have a meaningful debate about the 
normative dimensions of fairness in the use of predictive 
algorithms or machine learning without first specifying a social 
ontology of the human groupings about which we are concerned 
will be the basis for unfairness.  
2 IDENTIFYING UNSTATED 
ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
A classic algorithmic setup presents some real-world outcome 
(let’s call it	𝑅) that the tool is to predict—say, rearrest while out on 
bail or defaulting on a loan. The machine learning task is to 
construct a statistical predictor (call it 𝑌) of that outcome (𝑅) using 
features (call them 𝑋s) of the unit (e.g., the defendant facing a risk 
assessment or the applicant applying for a loan). The 𝑋s are some 
array of variables that capture features of the person seen to be 
relevant to the outcome—in the case of a pre-trial bail risk 
assessment, the 𝑋s might record a defendant’s age, occupation, 
income, number of prior convictions, etc. One of those features 
designates the “sensitive attribute” or “protected feature” (call it 𝑥&
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for “protected”)—e.g., a categorical variable indicating racial or 
sex status.4 
The formal approach to ensuring fairness or nondiscrimination 
asks what the proper mathematical relation ought to look like 
between the target outcome to be predicted (𝑅), the predictor (𝑌), 
and the unit’s attributes used in prediction (𝑋s) (which include the 
“protected attribute,” 𝑥&). There are many competing substantive 
definitions of what the proper theory of equality, or “fairness” as 
commonly termed in the literature, should look like in formal 
mathematical terms. For example, one might claim that under the 
proper formalization of equality or nondiscrimination, the predictor 𝑌  may be constructed from any function of the 𝑋 s except the 
“protected feature” (𝑥&  ⊄ 	𝑋); or one could specify the proper 
relation of equality as one of calibration (that the true outcome 𝑅 
should be independent of the “protected feature” 𝑥&	conditional on 
having the same value of the predictor 𝑌); or one could formulate 
the fairness desideratum in terms of parity in false positives, false 
negatives, or conditional probabilities among the “protected 
feature” groups [6, 7]. Most of the research and debate in the field 
up to now has focused on this question of determining the “correct” 
substantive definition of “fairness” that may then be applied to 
various prediction problems at hand. 
Increasingly, many such endeavors have recognized the 
limitations of specifying statistical fairness definitions based on 
observational data and have turned to methods based on causal 
diagrams using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that present a 
formal model for how the relevant features in a dataset stand in 
causal relation to each other [8-11]. For proponents of these 
approaches, causal inference tools can distinguish “spurious 
covariation” from true “deterministic functional relationships 
between variables” because they propose a model for the “data-
generating process” [12, pp. 42-43]. Since “fairness” is a relation 
between humans and not numbers, only by appealing to models that 
show the connections among the real in-the-world entities that the 
data reference can we settle debates between competing definitions 
of fairness or competing interpretations of any statistical evidence 
of discrimination.  
The practice of looking to qualitative models to guide the use 
and interpretation of statistical methods did not begin with the 
advent of DAGs. Yet, in our view, the same ontological mistakes 
that we discuss in this paper pervade many other social scientific 
methodologies and forms of reasoning under various guises: in the 
language of proxies, “adjusting for” features that correlate with the 
category, and even in most interpretations of the classic audit study. 
                                                             
4 Language suggesting that only some people are in “protected groups” because they 
have a “sensitive feature” is misleading. Race, sex, national origin, and other 
prohibited bases of discrimination are exhaustive forms of social categorization; every 
person can be assigned a status vis-à-vis each of these categories. The question is thus 
not whether an individual is part of a “protected group,” but rather which 
characteristics, capacities, freedoms, or other aspects of being so assigned to such a 
group are “protected” in in what ways. 
5 Judea Pearl’s work on causal inference is expansive and spans hundreds of scholarly 
contributions in the form of journal articles, surveys, and books. His theoretical results 
in the field are summarized in his textbook Causality: Models, Reasoning, and 
Inference (2nd. ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, which 
combines his work from 1987 to 2000 into a unified framework for causal discovery 
and inference. His work has also been popularized for a wider audience in a book 
But thanks in large part to the pioneering work of Judea Pearl, 
causal DAGs have become one of the most well-recognized formal 
approaches to modeling the social phenomena that underlie the data 
utilized by researchers in machine learning.5 We will, therefore, 
focus our analysis on DAGs because they present the clearest way 
of understanding the proffered ontology of the groups that may be 
subject to violation of equal protection, unfairness, or 
discrimination (recognizing these are different, we will nonetheless 
use ‘discrimination’ for simplicity throughout). 
In these diagrams, the features of the units (in most cases, 
individuals) are represented as nodes, and the arrows between 
nodes indicate how the author believes the causal structure to stand 
between those features. Below is an example that is repeated 
throughout the literature, drawn from a 1970s sex discrimination 
study of Berkeley graduate admissions [14]. The case is supposed 
to illustrate the merits of causal inference techniques, in contrast 
with standard statistical approaches. The setup is fairly simple: at 
the university level, 44% of male graduate school applicants were 
accepted to Berkeley compared to only 35% of female applicants. 
However, when the data are stratified at the department level, this 
gap vanishes: women are admitted at roughly equal rates compared 
to men and sometimes even at slightly higher rates. As it turns out, 
this is because women apply to “more competitive” departments at 
higher rates (i.e., departments where there are more applicants 
relative to available spots, such as those in the social sciences and 
humanities). 
Rather than frame the discrimination question in statistical 
terms about which set of correlations between sex and admissions 
should be “believed,” the causal theorist first draws a diagram 
indicating how the data are generated—that is, the cause-effect 
mechanisms in the world that brought about the data. In the diagram 
below, reproduced from one of Pearl’s discussions of the problem, 
sex “causes” both department choice and admissions. Pearl 
proposes that we understand the “direct effect” of Sex on 
Admissions as intentional discrimination, which is “confounded” 
observationally by the “indirect effect” of Sex on Admissions that 
goes through the mediator Department Choice.6 
written with Dana Mackenzie: Judea Pearl and Dana Mackenzie. 2018. The Book of 
Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect. Basic Books, New York, NY. We draw 
extensively from both of these books in our discussion of causal inference methods. 
6  Pearl seems to believe that the “direct causal effect of sex” is an accurate 
formalization of what is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the federal 
antidiscrimination statute (see, e.g. Causality, 2nd Edition, p. 131), which is at least 
incomplete and at most inaccurate. See, e.g., the “motivating factor” definition in Title 
VII, “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (m) (West). 
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Figure 1 (Pearl, The Book of Why, 312) 7 
 
At this point, we will set aside the question of what relation 
such a formalization bears to reigning doctrinal or statutory 
definitions of discrimination. Rather, we inquire into what sorts of 
claims diagrams like this one are making about our social world. 
As we will argue throughout the paper, all of these formalizations 
have in common a particular (unstated) ontology of statuses such as 
race or sex, meaning a proposition about the nature and properties 
of the things represented by nodes. Namely, they propose that an 
individual’s being in a racial or sex category consists in their having 
a particular trait or attribute. At the individual level, this means that 
for a person to have a particular racial or sex status is merely to be 
characterized by an inherent physical, bodily feature or 
genealogical attribute, conceptually no different from having a size 
8 foot or being descended from parents who passed down the 
recessive gene for attached earlobes.8 At the social level, this means 
that racial or sex groups merely consist in collecting together 
individuals that share that inherent trait or genealogical attribute.  
Although they never explicitly state their ontological 
assumptions, we will argue that the structure and logic of these 
causal diagrams only make sense under the assumption that sex 
(and race) are inherent individual-level attributes. To understand 
why, we need to take a step back and appreciate the advancement 
proposed by Pearlian causality over standard statistics. To make a 
long story short, classical statistics was limited in its ability 
(according to Pearl, because it lacked a formal language and 
syntax) and willingness (according to Pearl, because statisticians 
were too modest and nervous to put their theoretical cards on the 
table and propose what empirical forces generated the patterns in 
the data being analyzed) to make claims about how the entities 
represented by variables actually related to each other in the world 
[12, 13]. Statisticians limited their claims about 𝑋 s and 𝑌 s to 
                                                             
7 We refer to the node labeled “Gender” (usually understood to reference the social 
meanings and social practices associated with sex features) as “Sex” (physical sex 
features such as gonads, hormones, genitalia, chromosomes, and gametes) because we 
believe that more accurately captures what the researchers are referencing with this 
node, as will become clear in our discussion of modularity. As such, we use “Sex” 
throughout the paper when referring to the category represented by the node in DAGs, 
but sex (without scare quotes and not capitalized) in the text to reference the social 
groupings at issue in fairness debates.  
8 Even if one extends this list to include inherent psychological traits the same critique 
we levy apply.  
9  These are all words that Pearl uses throughout his writing on causality. See his 
introduction of the concept in the Introduction of Book of Why [13, p.13]. The talk of 
wiggling extends beyond Pearl, see e.g., Daniel M. Hausman and James Woodward. 
1999. Independence, Invariance, and the Causal Markov Condition. The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 4, (December 1999), 521-583. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.4.521 
10 Defining causality in terms of manipulations is popular among statisticians. The 
slogan “No causation without manipulation” was coined by statisticians Donald Rubin 
and Paul Holland as a guide dictating when causal conclusions may be drawn from 
statements about how they were statistically “related,” 
“associated,” or “correlated,” all terms that refer exclusively to 
relations between numbers and do not make any claims about the 
real-world relations between the entities represented by the data. 
Pearl’s approach upends this epistemic modesty with unabashed 
assertions about the in-the-world forces that variables exert on each 
another that ultimately generate the statistical regularities we 
observe as data. As he rightly points out, why else would we be 
collecting and analyzing data if not to understand the empirical 
relations that actually obtain in our world? On Pearl’s account, a 
key benefit of causal models is that they require researchers to be 
explicit about their theory of what causal relations generate the data 
observed. As we will discuss more below, the models also require 
the researcher to be explicit about something else: namely, their 
theory of ontological boundaries between entities in the world.  
In Pearl’s framework, to assert 𝑋	 →  𝑌  is to assert that 𝑌 
“listens to” 𝑋 , or less metaphorically, that 𝑌  is a mathematical 
function of 𝑋 and can be written as 𝑌	 = 	𝑓(𝑋) such that changes 
in 𝑋 necessarily lead to changes in 𝑌. The arrow refers to a real in-
the-world mechanism by which 𝑌 “hears” 𝑋, such that the value of 𝑌  responds to “wiggles” in the value of 𝑋 . 9  This language of 
“listening” and responding to “wiggling” is a relaxation of the 
stricter language of “manipulability,” in which 𝑋 → [causes] 𝑌 just 
in case manipulations in 𝑋 effect changes in 𝑌.10 Pearl and others 
argue that limitations in our capacity to actually carry out the 
proffered manipulations do not give a principled reason to preclude 
theoretical recognition of causes and counterfactuals.11 Pearl is thus 
devoted to an “interventionist” understanding of causality, where 
the “cause-effect” or “total effect” of 𝑋 on 𝑌 is given in do-calculus 
form—the probability distribution of 𝑌 given that 𝑋 is (somehow) 
just set to	𝑥:	𝑃(𝑌|	𝑑𝑜(𝑋	 = 	𝑥)). 		 
In defining causes via these surgical interventions, the 
diagrams depict a modular conception of causal systems. 
Modularity is the key technical assumption that drives the 
epistemic value of these DAGs in various ways. Causal modularity 
reflects the general assumption that each cause-effect pair (e.g., Sex 
à Admission, Department à Admission), represents distinct 
causal mechanisms that can be manipulated separately.12 
For example, the causal diagram relating Sex (𝑆), Department 
Choice (𝐷), and Admission (𝐴) in Figure 1 can be rewritten as a 
data. Here “manipulations” refer to manipulations on units that can actually be 
specified and are actionable by a third-party experimenter, thus illustrating a clear 
difference between the Rubin-Holland and Pearl conceptions of causality. See Paul W. 
Holland. 1986. Statistics and Causal Inference. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 81, 396, (October 1985), 945-970. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2330-
8516.1985.tb00125.x  
11 See, e.g., Clark Glymour. 1986. Comment: Statistics and Metaphysics. Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 81, 396, (December 1986), 964–966. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1986.10478357; Clark Glymour and Madelyn R. 
Glymour. 2014. Commentary: Race and Sex Are Causes. Epidemiology 25, 4, (July 
2014), 488-490. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1097/EDE.0000000000000122; Peter Sprites, 
Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines. 2001. Causation, Prediction, and Search (2nd. 
Ed.). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA; James Woodward. 2003. Making Things Happen: 
A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. 
12 As Woodward explains, “Each equation in a system of equations should represent a 
distinct causal mechanism, where the criterion for distinctness of mechanisms is that 
distinct mechanisms should be changeable (in principle) independently of one 
another.” JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION 329–330 (Oxford University Press) (2005). 
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series of structural equations that capture the causal dependencies 
between the three variables. 
 
(i) 𝐷	 = 	𝑓(𝑆)  [This equation captures the causal 
dependence of Department Choice on Sex] 
(ii) 𝐴	 = 	𝑔(𝑆,𝐷)  [This equation captures the causal 
dependence of Admission on Sex and Department 
Choice] 
 
One important upshot of modularity as “invarian[ce] under 
interventions” is that it makes it possible to mathematically 
distinguish between direct effects and indirect effects. Here, Sex 
causally affects Admission in two distinct ways: directly via 
equation (ii), and indirectly via Department Choice in equation (i), 
which in turn exerts causal influence on Admission via equation 
(ii). By assuming that one surgical intervention does not disrupt 
other causal dependencies in the system, modularity allows 
multiple interventions to be performed at once in a way that isolates 
the causal effects propagated down some, but not other, pathways. 
Examples will be instructive. Suppose, for simplicity, that 
there are two settings of S, s1 and s2 (assume for example, “male” 
and “female”), and two setting of D, d1 and d2 (assume for 
example “history” and “math”). We can isolate the controlled 
direct effect (CDE) of Sex on Admission by “wiggling” S without 
allowing D to move by applying the do operator twice. Say, for 
example, we wanted to calculate the CDE of Sex on Admission in 
the math department. We set the value for Department by 
performing do(D=d1) (imagine forcing everyone to apply to the 
math department), and compare two settings of the value of Sex: 
first, setting the value to s1 via do(S=s1), (imagine requiring 
everyone to report their sex on the application form as “male”), and 
then, setting the value to s2 via do(S=s2), (imagine requiring 
everyone to report their sex on the application form as “female”). 
The controlled direct effect of Sex on Admissions is the difference 
in admissions outcome of these two settings of the causal diagram. 
Alternatively, we could isolate the natural direct effect (NDE) of 
Sex on Admissions, this time by allowing the causal pathway from 
S à D to operate without intervening on Department (imagine 
allowing applicants to apply to the department of their choice), but 
again comparing the same two settings of the value of Sex as 
before: first, setting the value to s1 via do(S=s1), and then, setting 
the value to s2 via do(S=s2). The natural direct effect of Sex on 
Admissions is the difference in these two settings of the diagram.  
Remember, all of these operations are only possible because 
the pathways are modular—because “each family [i.e. pair of 
casual relations] in the causal diagram represents an autonomous 
physical mechanism and is subject to change without influencing 
other mechanisms.”13 If each path in a causal diagram represents a 
distinct causal mechanism, then it should theoretically be possible 
to mathematically and empirically (at least conceptually) alter one 
without affecting any others.   
                                                             
13Jin Tian & Judea Pearl, Causal Discovery from Changes, , 513 (2013).  
It is important to highlight that the modularity condition is 
crucial to the inference capabilities of causal models in the Pearlian 
project of moving computational science from the desert of 
associational statements to the promised land of causal statements. 
If we can accurately formalize a real-world data-generating process 
in a causal diagram, then we can identify and even instate 
theoretically-possible interventions into that process. The point of 
decomposing a unit’s features into distinct nodes linked together 
via distinct causal pathways is to identify different points of 
intervention that may be independently probed by operations 
represented by the do-calculus. The more nodes and pathways in 
one’s causal diagram, the more sites there are for the “surgical 
interventions” to uncover all sorts of causal effects—total, direct, 
and indirect—and distinguish them from others.  
With these concepts of causal models in hand, we can turn to 
what we believe are the conceptual, and eventually normative, 
pitfalls in conceptualizing sex (and race and other salient social 
categories) as individual traits that modularly cause “effects.” 
 
3 THE POPE IS A CATHOLIC-Y THING 
To motivate why we think these ontological assumptions 
about the social status of sex are major conceptual errors, we will 
draw an analogy with religious status as a “sensitive feature.” We 
proceed by way of this example because it is more commonly 
understood that the status is constituted by a collection of social 
relations and intersubjective beliefs as opposed to being an intrinsic 
individual attribute or psychological state.  
Figures 2 and 3 present two different ways that a collection of 
“features” of a person, including their “sensitive feature” of being 
Catholic, can relate to an outcome of interest. If one is committed 
to modeling these relations in a causal diagram, it is not clear if one 
should propose that the beliefs and practices listed in these figures 
cause the status “Catholic” (Figure 2), or if they are caused by 
“Catholic” (Figure 3).14 In Figure 2, what would it mean to draw 
beliefs in papal infallibility or the resurrection of Christ, practices 
such as observing Sunday Sabbath at Church, and adherence to the 
Bible as a sacred text as causal of the status Catholic? Well, the 
first thing that it would mean is that those particular tenets, beliefs, 
and practices exist as what-they-are and that the node “Catholic” 
exists as what-it-is independently of those particular tenets, beliefs, 
and practices. But what is the status of the belief that, “a man named 
‘Jesus’ was crucified some 2000 years ago, and after being dead for 
three days, came back to life” independent of Catholic religious 
institutions and of the other tenants and practices in the middle of 
the model; and what is “Catholic” independent of belief in the 
resurrection of Christ?  
The fact that it would be wrongheaded to “control for” 
Resurrection of Christ in an attempt to statistically estimate the total 
effect of “Catholic” on Outcome is not because it commits causal 
inference heresy by treating a mediator as a confounder (i.e., it isn’t 
because the “correct” causal structure is given by Figure 2, rather 
14 We capitalize names of nodes, but since Catholic is capitalized in all instances we 
put scare quotes around it when referring to the node “Catholic” and not when we are 
talking about the concept of Catholic. 
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than Figure 3). It is because theoretically it is not clear what 
“Catholic” and Belief in the Resurrection of Christ mean 
independently of each other. The fancy philosophical way of saying 
this is that the things in boxes in the middle of these figures are 
constitutively related to—as opposed to causally related to—the 
social category referenced by the node “Catholic.” Constitutive 
relations explain how something is an instance of the kind that it is 
(e.g. By virtue of what parts, organization, or features does this 
particular instance of a thing (token) count as a member of a general 
abstract sort of thing (type)), or how it is that the parts and 
organization that make up the system give it the properties and 
features that it has (e.g. By virtue of what structural arrangements 
does this thing have the capacities and properties it does?).  
Constitutive or definitional relations are conceptually distinct 
from causal ones. Causal relations are diachronic; they relate as a 
dependency between two independently existing entities unfolding 
over time, wherein the “source” of one event is identified with 
another. John Bon Jovi throws the rock at 𝑡8 , and the window 
breaks at 𝑡9. It is the temporal ordering of causation—first cause, 
then effect—that puts the 𝐴 in DAG: the graph must be acyclic 
otherwise a downstream variable could “cause” an upstream 
variable that is temporally prior, or even loop back and cause itself.  
Constitutive and definitional relations do not have the same 
temporal directionality, where feature-one must take its value first 
in order for feature-two to “listen” and then decide what its value 
must be. Constitutive and definitional relations are synchronous. 
The dependence of features is defined by how they relate to each 
other at a given moment to compose the thing as an instance of the 
specific type it is, or to imbue it with its distinctive properties. 
For example, a model of a water molecule showing one 
oxygen atom bonded to two hydrogen atoms via polar covalent 
bonds does not express a temporally ordered causal dependency of 
features. It depicts the atomic constituents of water, which in turn 
explain why the water molecule has the properties it does. 
Constitutive and definitional relations are as intuitively familiar and 
commonsensical as causal relations—academic departments, a 
                                                             
15 It is important to not conflate these levels of abstraction. The question, “What social 
facts and relations constitute the social kind ‘Catholic’?” is distinct from the question, 
student population, an educational mission are features that are 
constitutive, not causal, of the social kind “university”; its being 
August does not cause it to be summer in the Northern Hemisphere; 
rather, it is in virtue of the definitions of summer and of August, 
that August in the Northern Hemisphere is in the summer; yellow 
and blue define green. But at the same time, these sorts of relations 
are just as tricky when you push on them (especially when we are 
talking about social kinds!).  
Constitutive and causal relations are easily confused because 
they both offer responses to “why” questions. Understanding the 
distinction between the two types of explanations points out 
multiple senses of “why.” For example, one could ask a “why” 
question at the social level such as, “Why is there Catholicism?”; 
or at the individual level such as, “Why is John Catholic?” On one 
interpretation of “why,” these are asking constitutive questions 
pitched at different levels of abstraction.15 Nevertheless, in both 
cases, we could point to the features in the middle of Figures 2 and 
3 as explanations. With respect to the first social-level question, the 
social kind “Catholic” exists because of those features and the 
relations between them (equivalently: “Catholic” exists as what it 
is by virtue of those features and the relations between them; in a 
world in which those features and relations between them do not 
exist, the social kind we know of today as the religion Catholicism 
does not exist). With respect to the second individual-level 
question, it is accurate to characterize John as “Catholic” because 
of his engagement with those characteristics, acts, behaviors, or 
attributes (equivalently: John is “Catholic” by virtue of those 
features and relations between them).  
Another interpretation of “why” is that these are asking causal 
questions pitched at different levels of abstraction. The causal 
question asks, at the social level, “What historical events brought 
about the existence of the thing we now recognize as 
‘Catholicism’?” or at the individual level, “What events in the 
world pre-dated and brought about in John the status of 
‘Catholic’?”. In the latter case, the answer, “Because his parents 
were Catholic, so he was raised Catholic,” is responsive, because it 
“What are the individual-level facts and relations necessary and sufficient for a person 
to count as a member of the social kind ‘Catholic’?” 
Figure 3 Figure 2 
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offers a mechanism that explains the emergence of the status that 
reigns at this moment.  
As this discussion shows, these different meanings of 
“because” correspond to different kinds of theoretical and empirical 
debates we can have about the construction of a social category. If 
we are asking a constitutive question, we could debate what the 
necessary and sufficient conditions are for an individual to count as 
being “Catholic” (i.e., must one self-identify as Catholic, attend 
mass, observe Sunday Mass?), or we could debate what social 
relations, practices, intersubjective beliefs, etc. produce the cultural 
category “Catholic” to be the social kind that it is. If we are asking 
a causal question, we could debate what prior and independently-
existing events or mechanisms are responsible for bringing about 
John’s religious affiliation (i.e., it was not his parents’ influence, 
but his uncle Len’s, that led John to embrace the Catholic Church). 
It is easy to mix up these different types of explanations and see 
them all as “causal” (after all, they all offer “because” answers), but 
they are conceptually distinct, and their suitability as explanations 
depend on the question that is being asked.  
With this in mind, if someone proposed the diagram in Figure 
2 above, and wanted to know the direct effect of “Catholic” on 
Outcome—i.e., the one that is not mediated through Papal 
Infallibility, Sunday Mass, or the Resurrection of Christ—the 
empirical reference for this relation is quite conceptually 
complicated. The problem, though, is not that it would be 
logistically, or in Pearl’s words, “physically,” hard to surgically 
alter the value of Papal Infallibility or Sunday Mass and retain the 
value “Catholic” at the level of a particular individual.16 After all, 
there are plenty of Catholics who do not believe in papal 
infallibility or who do not attend Sunday Mass, and it is quite easy 
to imagine telling a decision-maker that a particular candidate is 
Catholic but rejects papal infallibility or does not attend Sunday 
Mass and then observing their decisions. The problem is that at the 
social level, infallibility of the Pope is one of the key things that 
makes the religion of Catholicism the unique thing that it is, 
meaning that the Pope and his role in the Church is partially 
constitutive of the category “Catholic.” Since the Pope is a 
Catholic-y thing, it is theoretically wrong to claim that just because 
one has altered the value of Papal Infallibility for a particular 
individual or even a set of individuals, one has isolated the effect 
of the “Catholic” node and purged it from any noise from the node 
Papal Infallibility.17 And just because we could set religion to a 
different value for a particular individual or even a set of 
individuals—say, do(Jewish)—and maintain the value of Papal 
                                                             
16  Nancy Cartwright has disputed non-modularity in causal systems by providing a 
four-equation model of gas flow in a carburetor in which the variables and 
dependencies represented in each equation implicate the others, thus denying the 
existence of interventions that could leave other causal relationships invariant. James 
Heckman has made a similar charge against non-modularity. Pearl’s response to these 
challenges has been to point out we need not have a tool in the real world to physically 
conduct the interventions in order for us to posit them symbolically in the do calculus. 
Instead, the causal theorist posits that we just can disrupt the mechanism and just “grab 
object 1 and bring it to a stop.” We argue that in the case of socially-constituted objects, 
one cannot so easily “grab” and “stop” the object. To stick with the metaphor, when 
we try to grab and change the object, the object transforms into a completely different 
object of which we have little familiarity. We cannot just continue to compute causal 
effects as before, because this new object might have different causal properties 
entirely. It would be like asking about the causal properties of a water molecule after 
Infallibility, this does not mean we have purged it of any valence 
of “Catholic” and isolated the causal effect of Papal Infallibility net 
of Catholicism because the Pope is, abidingly, a Catholic-y thing. 
Recall that the purpose of these causal diagrams is not simply 
to capture observed statistical variation in outcomes among 
collections of individuals who do or don’t have various attributes. 
The diagrams are supposed to tell us about general causal 
dependencies that obtain in the world, and to allow us to model how 
hypothetical manipulations would play out in the real world along 
those causal dependencies if the intervention actually occurred. In 
fact, causal DAGs are especially useful when interventions are hard 
to perform in practice because the methodology gives us the ability 
to infer what would happen if we could do it.  
But if Catholic as a social kind is in part constituted by features 
such as papal infallibility, belief in the resurrection of Christ, and 
Sunday Mass, then what are we supposed to have in mind, at a 
theoretical conceptual level, when asked to consider those features 
independently of each other? Is it theoretically plausible that the 
node “Catholic” has the same causal capacity to bring about 
Outcome even when the category is severed from a belief in papal 
infallibility, resurrection of Christ, or no longer involves the 
liturgical ritual of Sunday Mass? Is it theoretically plausible that 
belief in papal infallibility, resurrection of Christ, and observation 
of Sunday Mass have causal powers vis-à-vis Outcome even when 
they bear no relation to Catholicism? Of course, we can imagine 
interventions that surgically alter a constitutive feature at the 
individual level—e.g., John is a Catholic, and he adheres to all of 
the standard tenets, beliefs, and practices of Catholicism; Clara is a 
Catholic, but she rejects Pope Francis and hasn’t attended Mass 
since she was 6—but these individual operations do not change 
how the categories and concepts relate at the social level. The Pope 
is a Catholic-y thing, even if Clara doesn’t take it to be so. In a 
similar vein, we can also consider the consequences of changing a 
constitutive feature. For example, the Pope could declare that the 
Pope is no longer infallible and abolish his position as the head of 
the Catholic Church. Such an event would most definitely change 
the very meaning of “Catholic” as it stands today and the ways that 
such a status brings about outcomes in the world.   
The same goes for interpreting the causal effects of 
constitutive features. When we interpret differences in Outcomes 
between Johns and Claras as the direct causal effects of papal 
infallibility and Sunday Mass unmediated by Catholic, we are 
positing a set of causal relationships between the objects at some 
general social level, not a spurious coincidence of features and 
a single atom of hydrogen is removed. Such a manipulation would make the entity no 
longer a water molecule, and it would instead be a hydroxide ion. See James Heckman. 
2005. The Scientific Model of Causality. Sociological Methodology 35, 1, (August 
2005), 1–97; Nancy Cartwright. 2007. Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches 
in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom. For Pearl’s response to Cartwright and Heckman, see Judea Pearl. 2009. 
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (2nd. ed.). Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 364-365.  
17 To state the obvious, the purpose of this discussion is not to declare that papal 
infallibility is unquestionably a constitutive feature of the category Catholic. Maybe it 
isn’t or shouldn’t be. But the point is that if papal infallibility were a constitutive 
feature of Catholic, then it is not modular. We do not explore here the different 
philosophical approaches to determining constitutive relevance.  
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outcomes. Remember, we only care about John and Clara to the 
extent that data collected about their fates illuminate relations 
between features, types, and categories at a more general level. But 
“papal infallibility,” “Sunday Mass,” and “Catholic” just aren’t 
distinct objects at the social level.  
To see how a causal picture of the category Catholic is 
conceptually confused, suppose we insisted on the relations drawn 
in Figure 2 and performed the do intervention on Sunday Mass at 
Church to set it to Saturday Shabbat at Temple to produce Figure 
4. By modularity, all other features and relations in the diagram 
must stay invariant, meaning that the category Catholic retains its 
exact same meaning as before and causes its other effects via the 
exact same mechanisms as before.  
 
The upshot of this modular conception of Catholicism is that 
if all Catholics were to ditch Sunday Mass at Church and instead 
attend Saturday Shabbat service at Temple, the category “Catholic” 
would still be what-it-is today and retain its same causal connection 
with papal infallibility, the Seven Sacraments, infant baptism, and 
so on. More dramatically, we could eliminate the causal pathway 
between Catholic and the Resurrection of Christ and draw 
inferences about the category “Catholic” just the same!18  
A constitutive view of the category would entail a completely 
different diagram, methodology, and set of counterfactuals. If 
Sunday Mass, papal infallibility, the resurrection of Christ, the 
Seven Sacraments, and so on are beliefs, practices, and doctrines 
that make “Catholic” what-it-is, then changing the relation between 
the features via operations like conditioning, adjusting, and holding 
constant risks changing the meaning of the concepts themselves, 
and therefore, the way those statuses relate to other outcomes in the 
world. The inference tools that are designed to tease apart the causal 
effects of distinct mechanisms are not helpful in understanding how 
and why Catholic brings about Outcome because simply put, the 
status “Catholic” does not cause, nor is it caused by, its associated 
beliefs and practices via any such divisible mechanisms—it has the 
properties it does precisely because they are bundled together in a 
                                                             
18  This same thought experiment applies to Figure 3. If you were to change the 
“confounders,” it is not clear that the thing doing the causing remains the same thing 
after these operations. For example, is the direct effect of “Catholic” really measured 
particular way. Any methodology that models the category 
Catholic within a system of modular causes is simply theoretically 
mistaken about how the status operates in the social world. 
We will briefly preview here how causal diagrams can be 
repurposed into constitutive diagrams, which show how certain 
social-level practices, beliefs, regularities, or relations constitute a 
category. As we will discuss more extensively below, we fully sign 
onto the Pearlian project of demanding that researchers lay their 
theoretical cards on the table regarding the mechanisms that they 
believe to be generating their data. We simply point out that those 
mechanisms extend beyond causal relations between features to 
constitutive or definitional relations between features. Proposing a 
theoretical map of what constitutes the category “Catholic” is just 
as essential as a causal map. With the former in hand, one can know 
that it is possible that the status “Catholic” means something 
different at the individual level if the person attends Saturday 
Shabbat service instead of Sunday Mass, or if, at the social level, 
the meaning of “Catholic” changes when a belief in papal 
infallibility is no longer constitutive of the category. In fact, only 
an account of what social factors constitute a category can provide 
an explanation of the moral valence of the practices we call 
“discrimination.” Because a constitutive construction provides an 
analytical model of what makes the status meaningful as a social 
categorization scheme, it presents the exact information one would 
need to debate about what practices are wrongfully discriminating 
on the basis of a given category.  
 
4 MATH IS A MALE-Y THING, AND THAT’S 
THE PROBLEM 
We hope the example of religious status as constituted, not 
caused, by a set of beliefs, practices, and doctrines has motivated 
the intuition behind our arguments about the socially-constituted 
nature of other human categories such as race and sex that are more 
frequently the objects of debates in machine learning fairness. 
Returning to the case of sex in the Berkeley admissions case, 
consider the more complex diagram of the situation below, 
reproduced from Pearl’s textbook Causality [12].  
 
Figure 5 (Pearl, Causality, 129) 
by holding the value of Sabbath at the constant counterfactual value it would have 
taken if Catholic were a different religion?  
Figure 4 
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As we will show, there are two ontological implications of 
causal diagrams such as this one. The first is that the node “Sex” 
(read: Sex-On-Its-Own) exists as an attribute or trait that inheres in 
an individual, and it is capable causally of bringing about certain 
social phenomena external to it in the world. A corollary of this 
view of sex is that a sex group is simply a collection of individuals 
who share the “Sex” attribute. The second ontological implication 
is that the meaning of sex in our social world stays the same even 
as relations between sex and its associated “effects” are modified 
(i.e., intervened on). This ontology is clearly represented in the 
pictorial representation of “Sex” as a node with arrows directed 
outward indicating distinct causal pathways by which it brings 
about its “effects”. More formally, these ontological assumptions 
follow from the technical assumption of modularity, which has 
been described as the “essence of Pearl’s approach.”19  
By drawing the node “Sex” (𝑋8) as a cause of “Choice of 
Department” (𝑋9 ) and as a cause of “(Pre-Enrollment) Career 
Objectives” (𝑍), the diagram in Figure 5 posits that the category 
“Sex” is a conceptually distinct object in the world from choices of 
department and career objectives. That is, “Sex” (read: Sex-On-Its-
Own) must exist and have causal powers even if its patterns relating 
to “Choice of Department” and “Career Objectives” did not obtain. 
Further, the causal pathways Sex → Choice of Department and Sex → Career Objectives propose that Sex-on-its-own has the capacity 
to bring about these effects in the world via distinct social, 
psychological, or physical mechanisms that can theoretically be 
retained or collapsed away while leaving invariant all other aspects 
of the diagram. This model requires that it be theoretically possible 
to distinguish the mechanism by which “Sex” causes “Career 
objectives” from the mechanism by which “Sex” causes “Choice of 
department” from the mechanism by which “Sex” causes a 
decisionmaker to express his “taste” for male candidates.  
The relationships captured by Sex → Choice of Department 
and Sex → Career Objectives captures, among other things, social 
mechanisms that make it the case that more people sex-coded 
‘male’ than ‘female’ apply to math departments and that more 
people sex-coded ‘male’ than ‘female’ are socialized into thinking 
math-y fields are suitable career objectives. And this is of course 
the problem motivating fairness in ML (and antidiscrimination law 
generally). The only reason to be concerned with rupturing how 
decisionmakers take ‘Sex’ to be a reason for admission would be to 
disrupt these dependencies for the purposes of changing the very 
social meaning of these nodes, so that math no longer is a male-y 
thing.  
But these diagrams suggest that even if we do that, ‘Sex’ 
would retain its current causal properties. In positing divisible 
mechanisms for these separate dependencies, modular causal 
diagrams propose that any such “effects” of sex—e.g., department 
choice, career objectives—can be set to take any value (the do 
intervention), disrupted (by holding constant, for example), or 
allowed to “listen” for its value (keeping the causal effect as is)—
all without affecting any other nodes or dependencies drawn in the 
                                                             
19  Philip Dawid. 2010. Seeing and Doing: The Pearlian Synthesis. Heuristics, 
Probability and Causality: A Tribute to Judea Pearl. 309.  
diagram. That is, features and causal relationships remain stable 
unless they are explicitly intervened on. Since these diagrams are 
intended to be explanatory of social phenomena, stability of 
features also entails a stability of the meaning of the features. It 
assumes that, for example, the social meaning of department choice 
“math” would be the same even in a world in which it were not a 
department to which more males rather than females applied. In the 
same vein, it assumes that the social meaning of the node “Sex” 
would be the same in a world in which there were not a certain 
sexed pattern of career objectives or a certain sexed pattern of 
applicants to graduate departments.  
What do all of these permissible operations and assumptions 
under the umbrella of modularity imply about sex (and race and so 
on) as a social kind? They suggest sex to be a category that could 
be different in its causal relations with other nodes via hypothetical 
interventions yet still mean what it means in our world. This 
fundamental stability of categories and causes (unless explicitly 
intervened on) is essential because without it, causal operations can 
alter the meaning of a category, fundamentally change how it is 
situated within a causal diagram, and undermine the validity of any 
inferences drawn on the diagram as corresponding to any real 
phenomenon in the world (and DAGs would no longer be acyclic).  
5 WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE ONTOLOGY 
OF SEX AS A MODULAR CAUSAL 
FORCE? AND CAN DAGS WITH SEX 
NODES BE RECYCLED? 
In this section, we hope to show that the theory of sex 
necessitated by DAGs is conceptually wrong from a social 
ontology perspective, and it is wrong in a way that has serious 
implications for how we go about debating fairness in machine 
learning and algorithmic prediction. 
Let’s return to the whole point of using causal DAGs in fair 
machine learning endeavors. They provide an additional theoretical 
tool that can adjudicate debates between various mathematical 
formulations of fairness or different substantive interpretations of 
statistical relations observed between features in a dataset. Recall 
Pearl’s trenchant critique of the classical statistics debates: only 
theoretical claims about how the data we observe are actually 
produced in the world can settle which model is the “right” one and 
thus, which mathematical techniques and operations are 
appropriate in analyzing the data. Inspired by this critique, some 
researchers have proposed that causal models are essential to fair 
machine learning because they model the empirical mechanisms 
producing the data, allowing us to reference social facts—not just 
statistical facts—in debates about whether an algorithmic system is 
issuing “fair” or “discriminatory” predictions. For example, a 
researcher who seeks the “direct effect of Sex on Admission” in 
Figure 1 is justified in holding department choice constant because 
the node is a causal mediator standing between sex and outcome 
(presuming the researcher endorses the definition of discrimination 
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as consisting only in the direct effect of Sex). Other researchers can, 
of course, disagree about the operation. They can redraw the 
diagram so that the node is in fact a confounder and not a mediator, 
or they can draw another node that confounds the original two 
nodes, or they can argue that a particular path be disabled because 
it is “unfair.” Each of these modeling choices are grounded in 
different empirical and normative understandings of the world and 
correspondingly, each advocates for a different set of operations as 
the “right” ones to detect discrimination. DAGs encourage this 
plurality of approaches. They remind us to ground our 
mathematical procedures in theoretical, empirical, and moral 
claims about how the world works and how it ought to work.  
We concur that putting one’s theoretical cards on the table 
about what the structures of the social world are and what 
constitutes discrimination is crucial to any debate about fairness in 
machine learning. But researchers have thus far limited themselves 
to proposing analytic models of causal relations exclusively. In our 
view, this is a mistake, and analytic models constructed to detect 
discrimination must also account for constitutive relations. Why? 
Because the social groups about which we are concerned will be 
the object of discrimination or algorithmic unfairness are 
constituted by complex social relations and meanings, and only 
when we act on one of their constitutive features could the practice 
be deemed discriminatory. Without a model of what the category 
is, we cannot even start to have the debate about when acting on it 
is wrongful.  
The view that socially salient categories such as sex and race 
are not constituted by sharing a physical trait or genealogical 
feature but are in fact constituted by a web of social relations and 
meanings is often referred to as a constructivist ontology of these 
categories. A systematic defense of constructivism requires its own 
dedicated philosophical attention that extends beyond the scope of 
this paper.20 For our purposes, we offer a transcendental argument 
about what the nature of the category must be in order for us to 
worry that algorithms will produce a special form of morally 
problematic decision-making recognized as “discriminatory,” 
“biased,” or “unfair.” The argument we present is intended to show 
that if sex were merely an inherent feature or trait, and if sex groups 
were merely a collection of individuals who shared some set of 
inherent features or traits, then there would be no reason to think 
that the causal arrow connecting Sex to Admissions (capturing the 
“direct effect of Sex”) represents a type of action about which we 
ought to be concerned in this special way, a way that evidences that 
we were already concerned about the relative social standing of 
people when grouped by this trait. The groups about which we—
“we” being people concerned with living in a society wherein 
persons stand in a relation of democratic equality—are in fact 
legally and morally concerned will be the subject of “bias” or 
“discrimination” must necessarily consist in something more than 
merely sharing a physical feature or trait or genealogical features. 
They are the sorts of groups that are constituted by some 
                                                             
20  There is a deep literature on social construction across several disciplines. On 
ontology the social kinds, see, e.g., Sally Haslanger. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social 
Construction and Social Critique. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom; 
Ian Hacking. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press, 
configuration of social practices and meanings—those the very 
nodes that appear as distinct entities or “effects” in the DAGs 
above.  
Consider something that really is just an individual-level 
inherent trait like attached earlobes. Imagine someone proposes a 
simple DAG: Attached Earlobes →  Admission. We take it that 
when people draw the arrow Attached Earlobes → Admission, the 
mechanism they have in mind would be the fact that the 
decisionmaker took attached earlobes to be a reason to decline 
admission. But because the node Attached Earlobes just describes 
earlobes that attach directly to the side of the head—the trait doesn’t 
mean anything in our social world beyond this literal description—
the arrow does not reflect a regularity in the population about how 
decisions are made. It is just an idiosyncratic fact about this 
decisionmaker that she dislikes attached earlobes (i.e., has a “taste” 
for non-attached earlobes). Perhaps she has this aversion because 
her childhood bully had attached earlobes, and she was forced to 
peer at them while he kept her in a headlock on the playground. To 
refuse admission on the basis of attached earlobes may be 
irrational, it may be mean or unkind, it may still be wrongful but 
for reasons that don’t have anything to do with the meaning of 
attached earlobes in society generally or the standing of persons 
with attached earlobes relative to those with detached earlobes.  For 
example, the decisionmaker’s act might be wrong because it 
violates her duty to evaluate admissions on the basis of criteria 
relevant to academic performance, or because we think it is wrong 
to expect candidates to mask or surgically alter their physical traits 
to match the idiosyncratic preferences of decisionmakers.  
But the moral quality of what makes the act objectionable is 
distinctive from than that proposed by the arrows: Sex → 
Admissions, or Race →  Admission. Why? Because differently 
sexed or raced individuals face differently patterned outcomes 
along a number of important social dimensions. At a minimum, this 
is what the “indirect” effects of sex (the causal arrows between Sex → Career Objectives and Sex → Department Choice) refer to! To 
have a “sensitive attribute” is not merely to have an intrinsic 
attribute; it is to have an attribute that is “sensitive,” or “protected,” 
precisely because that attribute represents a collection of social 
arrangements, practices, and intersubjective beliefs that center 
around making it salient and consequential in our social world. If 
suddenly social relations and practices centered around the trait of 
attached earlobes, then that would change the meaning and causal 
properties of the trait and grouping of people with attached 
earlobes. If people with attached earlobes statistically tended to 
apply to humanities and not math departments because they were 
socialized and encouraged to see some career objectives as more 
suitable to their type than others, then what is referenced by the 
node Attached Earlobes would no longer only extend to the fact 
that one has a certain kind of physical trait. Being in the category 
would mean that one has that physical trait and that, by virtue of 
Cambridge, MA; Judith Butler. 1988. Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An 
Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, Theatre Journal, 40, 4, (December 
1988), 519–531. DOI:10.2307/3207893 
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that trait, one is treated as the type that is well-suited to intellectual 
pursuits of the humanistic, but not mathematical, variety.  
The reason we would then want to propose non-discrimination 
with respect to earlobe attachment status is because now what-it-is 
to be in an earlobe category is precisely not just having the trait, but 
to be treated and tracked in these particular ways that we find 
objectionable. That is, the reason why, in this imaginary world, 
earlobe status would be picked out as a category of concern at all is 
because of how the meaning of the category is constituted by social 
arrangements, practices, and intersubjective beliefs that make the 
categorization significant in many domains. As we have argued, 
disrupting the pathways between earlobes and department choice 
would not leave other features in the diagram and their 
dependencies invariant as modularity would have it. If department 
choice is a constitutive non-modular feature that makes Attached 
Earlobes what-it-is, then intervening on the feature transforms the 
social meaning of earlobe status, alters how the signifier “acts” in 
the world, and as a result, changes the normative quality of 
discrimination on its basis.   
6 CONCLUSION 
If what makes a practice discriminatory on the basis of a social 
group such as sex is that it acts on what it means to be in that 
category in a way we find wrongful or objectionable, then a useful 
analytic diagram should provide a model of what constitutes the 
category.21 Such a model would allow us to explain the special 
moral (and legal) reasons we have to be concerned with the 
treatment of this category by reference to the empirical social 
relations and meanings that establish the category as what it is. 
Causal models present the “protected category” as an isolated 
node—Sex-On-Its-Own—that can theoretically be partitioned from 
its “effects.” The resulting implication for a concept of 
discrimination is that the factors that give the “direct effect of Sex” 
its distinctively discriminatory moral quality would remain 
invariant under hypothetical interventions on the other nodes. That 
is, in a world where all of the indirect effects of, for example, Sex 
= female, were manually set to the values that would naturally 
obtain under conditions of Sex = male, then the meaning of the 
direct effect of Sex on Admission would remain discriminatory. 
If, as we have argued, many of the “causal effects” of sex are 
in fact constitutive of sex as a social status, then the distinction 
between the “protected category” node Sex-On-Its-Own, and some 
of its “effects” is moot for purposes of deciding when something is 
discriminatory. This does not mean that any time a practice acts 
upon sex, it is wrongfully discriminatory (remember, to decide this, 
we still have to fill in a moral theory of what counts as wrongful 
vis-à-vis the category), but it should lead us to question the assumed 
metaphysical distinction between acting on sex-on-its-own and 
acting on the social meanings of sex.22 What it is to discriminate on 
                                                             
21 Of course, we also need a moral theory of what is fair or nondiscriminatory given 
what the category is. This paper has focused on the need to answer first these 
ontological questions in order to even get the normative debate about the proper 
relation of equality off the ground.  
22 That is, we believe one implication of our argument is that the conceptual distinction 
between “indirect” and “direct” effects, “taste-based” and “statistical” discrimination, 
the basis of sex simply is to act on the basis of these socially-
constituted elements of sex. And sex is only available as a category 
that inspires discriminatory animus (i.e., inspires a “taste” for 
certain sex types)—as opposed to a thin affectual response or 
idiosyncratic preferences—because there are a wide range of social 
practices where similar meanings about that status are repeated and 
given effect. As our example of attached earlobes shows, if certain 
facts do not hold at the social-level, then taking attached earlobes 
as a reason for an unfavorable outcome is not wrongful in the 
morally weighty way that taking race or sex as a reason for an 
unfavorable outcome is. If this is right, then causal fairness’s entire 
methodological apparatus that disentangles “direct” effects and 
“indirect” effects of sex has few normative or metaphysical 
justifications.  
There are further practical pitfalls of methodologies premised 
on modularity as a way of reasoning about discrimination. Because 
the value of modular causal models lies in their ability to make 
causal inferences about the results of surgical interventions, DAGs 
are particularly well-suited to home in and compute the various 
direct, indirect, and path-specific effects of sex. The approach thus 
encourages a methodology of discrimination detection that poses 
highly sophisticated (and strange) counterfactuals as dispositive of 
whether discrimination has occurred: The question “Was the 
Berkeley admissions process discriminatory against applicants 
sexed female?” is answered by posing the counterfactual, “What 
would the admissions rate for female applicants be if all applicants 
to the math department reported a randomized sex on their 
applications?”23  As a threshold matter, it is unclear that such a 
counterfactual framing is correct even by the lights of conservative 
interpretations of federal anti-discrimination law in the U.S.24 More 
importantly, if sex is constituted by a set of non-modular features, 
then operations on these constitutive features alter the meaning of 
sex as a social category, and as such, there is no reason to think it 
will have the same social properties and meaning in this newly 
configured state.  
  Modular counterfactuals of the type, “What would the effect 
of sex on admissions be in a world when men and women apply at 
the same rates to math departments?” or “What would the effect of 
race be in a world where the family and neighborhood 
socioeconomic distribution of the Black population were set equal 
to that of the white population?” [27]—do not necessarily tell us 
anything empirically relevant to the normative question about 
whether a current practice is discriminatory in our current world 
where those premises are counter to fact. To acknowledge that math 
is a male-y thing means, among other things, that more people sex-
coded ‘male’ than ‘female,’ as a matter of fact, apply to math 
departments and that, cognitively, decision-makers associate male 
and math more than they associate female and math.25 That is, after 
all, the problem: we want to bring about a social world where math 
is not a male-y thing! It is not clear why knowing how people sex-
or “intentional” versus “disparate impact” discrimination cannot be drawn on the 
grounds that have traditionally been advanced. 
23  Pearl advocates for this counterfactual as a solution to the Berkeley sex 
discrimination problem under the name “natural direct effects” in [13, pp. 318-319].  
24 See footnote 2 supra. 
25 This is what we take the entire implicit bias literature to show.  
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coded ‘female’ would be treated in a counterfactual world where 
equal numbers of people sexed female and male applied to math 
departments is helpful for sorting out whether in our world, where 
math is a male-y thing, the current admission practices constitute 
discrimination.   
All of this is not to say that we ought to abandon modeling as 
such—quite the opposite, it is instead to point out the significant 
influence that models have on how we theorize and reason about 
normative questions. Causal diagrams are not the only type of 
formal models that can illuminate social phenomena and guide 
principled normative debate. Pearl’s own career, first in developing 
probabilistic Bayesian networks followed by his work on causal 
structural equations using DAGs, is a testament to how new 
models, techniques, and methodologies continually challenge 
existing paradigms and present new ways of asking and answering 
old questions. If the socially-constituted nature of a category 
provides the basis for what it means to wrongfully act on that 
category, then constitutive diagrams, which would show how 
certain social categories are constituted by an arrangement of social 
facts, are the only type of models that could allow us to even have 
the debate about discrimination on the right terms.  
The question then becomes: Given how a category is 
constituted, what algorithmic procedures do we consider fair? 
Constitutive diagrams of categories like sex and race would proffer 
explanations of how the meanings of those categories emerge from 
their constitutive structure; in other words, how the arrangement of 
complex social relations constitute a given group as what-it-is. 
Whereas causal diagrams facilitate inquiry into modular 
counterfactuals and ask how causal effects can be decomposed 
along different pathways, constitutive diagrams would highlight 
another counterfactual question: How might the social meaning of 
a group change if its constitutive elements are altered? That is, after 
all, the very promise of the antidiscrimination project: “[T]o 
transform the social meaning of social categories that have—for so 
long, in so many domains—been infused with disfavor and 
disadvantage” [28]. 
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